Posts Tagged ‘Microfinance’

India Regulator Proposes Radical Microfinance Reforms

January 22nd, 2011

This week, the Reserve Bank of India (India’s central banking regulator) proposed significant new microfinance regulations which would impact the majority of microfinance lending in India.

There are many new regulation recommendations which they hope to have adopted as early as April 1, 2011.  Here are a few highlights:

  • Create a new non-banking financial company category called NBFC-MFI with new regulations
  • Max microloan size of RS 25,000 (~US$500)
  • Minimum 12 months duration for loans under RS 15,000 (~US$300) and 24 months for loans above that
  • Each borrower chooses whether they make weekly, bi-weekly or monthly repayments
  • Only one joint liability group (or self-help group) per borrower and max of 2 loans per borrower
  • Interest rate cap of 10-12% margin over cost of capital
  • Minimum 90% of assets must be for microloans and at least 75% of these loans must be for business purposes
  • Limitation on loan-related revenue to interest, loan insurance (must be optional) and max 1% loan origination fee
  • NBFC-MFI must have minimum capitalization of RS 15 crore (~US$3m) up from RS 2 crore (US$500k)
  • Minimum capital adequacy of 15% up from 12% and with stricter definitions of capital basis
  • Consideration of appointing local bank officials or political appointees as arbitrators in loan repayment issues

The RBI is attempting to create a national regulatory framework which supersedes specific India state-based legislation like we have seen in Andra Pradesh.  Overall, I think national banking regulation with an independent regulator is positive for the poor in India.

It is going to be interesting to see what the reaction to this proposal is from the microfinance industry.  Typically, this type of legislation is generally embraced by the large, established players because it creates more certainty and they have the resources and sophistication to leverage this to grow their market share at the expense of the smaller players.  Since in microfinance scale often benefits operational efficiencies, it is easier for the larger players to manage their profit optimization under regulations with price caps.

So, I would expect that if this is implemented it would have the following results:

  • Slower growth in access to microfinance. The report notes that microfinance and self-help group market penetration is < 1% in all regions of India except the south where is is 3.4%.  Most MFIs will have to slow down growth as interest rate margin cap discourages forward investing.  Fewer new MFIs will start because of the higher initial costs and higher operating subsidy required before getting to large scale.  The interest margin cap will also dramatically slow growth in areas which are currently the most underserved — i.e. higher poverty and lower density areas of India where cost of operations are higher and revenue per client is lower (due to lower loan sizes).
  • Significant industry consolidation. The big, at-scale players will gobble up many of the smaller players or the smaller players may just fold.  This is not necessarily good for borrowers as it reduces competition and some of the higher value add approaches of these smaller players.
  • Less financial product innovation. The strict requirements are going to stall the development of better quality (from borrower perspective) financial products outside of the one-size-fits-all business microloan product.  This includes more business-cycle friendly working capital loans, housing loans, various insurance products, savings-type products, etc.  And % of revenue restrictions will prevent MFIs from distributing 3rd party products as well.
  • More populist politicalization of financial products for poor. This concept of appointing a local ombudsman (for loan repayment arbitration) from the local business or political elite has predictable results — corruption, political posturing and ultimately higher costs for MFIs (which can’t be passed along to borrowers).

Do you agree with my observations and/or conclusions?  Please add additional insights and thoughts in comments.

UPDATE: Here are additional responses to RBI recommendations:

Related Articles:

Disinformation on Microfinance Hurts the Poor

January 17th, 2011

Muhammad Yunus’ OpEd piece in Friday’s New York Times entitled Sacrificing Microcredit for Megaprofits is plainly and simply factually challenged.  Yunus advocates for changes which will result in fewer of the working poor receiving quality financial services and those who do will pay more for those services.

[NOTE:  Those of you who read my blog know that I have been a big fan of Yunus and his innovative contributions to the microfinance sector. But, more recently he has instigated a fierce vendetta against some of the strongest innovators in the microfinance space which undermines his credibility as an advocate for the poor.  I honestly don't know why he is doing this.  See references at end of this post.]

Bad Facts Lead to Bad Conclusions

Yunus has misrepresented facts which leads him to wrong and harmful conclusions.  Here are some examples:

  • “[commercial microfinance] banks needed to raise interest rates.” False. Microcredit interest rates for well-run, commercial microfinance operations are often lower than for non-profit microfinance operators.  What’s even more interesting is the fact that SKS Microfinance’s microloan interest rate is 24.55% APR vs. Grameen Bank’s interest rate of 24.36%-26.87% APR despite SKS having a much higher cost of capital since it can’t accept savings.
  • “borrowers [in India] came to believe lenders were taking advantage of them, and stopped repaying their loans.”  False. Populist politicians created falsehoods about microcredit loans leading to borrower suicides and enacted laws which prevented borrowers from repaying.  Fact: microcredit borrowers were 5-10x less likely to commit suicide then the general population.
  • “[commercial microfinance operators] treat microcredit as an ordinary profit-maximizing business.” False. Neither SKS nor Compartamos have operated in this way.  In fact, they have always been managed as client-focused, sustainable businesses.  See letter to editor below.
  • “Furthermore, it means commercial microcredit institutions are subject to demands for ever-increasing profits, which can only come in the form of higher interest rates charged to the poor, defeating the very purpose of the loans.”  Sounds credible, but too simplistic. Just about every growth business achieves higher profits through scale and additional services, not higher prices. Think Walmart, Google, Bharti or … SKS.

Here is a letter that Michael Chu, a respected microfinance expert submitted to the NY Times in response to Yunus’ OpEd:

Sunday, January 16, 2011 5:10 PM
To: letters@nytimes.com
Subject: Muhammad Yunus Op-Ed

To the Editor of the New York Times:

Having served in the front lines of microfinance for two decades, I found Muhammad Yunus attack on commercial microfinance (Op-Ed, January 14, “Sacrificing Microcredit for Megaprofits”) dangerously misleading at a time when the industry most needs clarity. His accusation that commercial microfinance inevitably leads to higher prices is plain wrong. Since its IPO in 2007, Mexico’s Compartamos Banco, which I am proud to have helped establish, has actually been reducing its interest rate (and, by the  way, tripling its active clients.) Yet, Compartamos has continued reporting outstanding financial returns. How is that possible? Simple: cost structures can be lowered, assets more efficiently managed and capital structures optimized. As any able manager knows, price is only one, and often the crudest, lever of profit.

But even more damaging, Yunus calls for government-mandated interest rate caps. This ignores the Latin American experience, where such short-sighted measures have always made reaching the poorest, and their smaller-sized loans, not more but less viable. Intense, open competition has been the most reliable way to ensure that the lowest priced loans reach the largest number of the poor in the shortest amount of time. That is why Bolivia has the lowest microfinance rates in the continent. And for that you need a healthy, commercial industry serving the poor.

Michael Chu
Senior Lecturer
Harvard Business School

Additional related resources:

India microfinance crisis by the numbers

November 16th, 2010

Finally a reporter who actually attempts to explain the objective facts on the current microfinance crisis in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.

Microfinance by the Numbers by Eric Bellman

Here are a few highlights:

  • Default rates by borrowers were ~2% before the politicians intervened and now have risen to 50% since they instructed borrowers not to repay their loans
  • On a per capita basis, there are 5-10x fewer suicides amongst microcredit borrowers than the general Indian population
  • Upon closer investigation, it appears that loan sharks, landlords and even family members are more to blame for the suicides than the microcredit companies
  • The interest rate for microcredit loans (24-30%) is the same as the local rate for credit cards (30%) which has never been controversial
  • Even though government schemes like self-help groups offer heavily subsidized 3% loans to women, why is there so much demand for microcredit (hint: loans insufficient, not available or require bribes)

Net: If the government continues this harassment of MFIs and imposes unreasonable regulations, the current microcredit borrowers will no longer have access to these financial services and will either have to go without, or more likely be back as clients of the local loan shark at 150-300% interest rate plus their well-known collection techniques.

SKS Microfinance IPO Report

September 30th, 2010

CGAP (part of The World Bank) has recently produced an analysis of SKS Microfinance IPO in India. This is the first IPO of an Indian MFI.  The IPO was 13 times oversubscribed … that is, 13 times more demand than availability of IPO shares.  SKS priced at the high end of their range with valuation of US$1.5B and sold 11% new stock raising US$155M.  In the first 5 weeks of trading, the stock rose 42%.

This article summarizes a lot of good historical and current data about SKS and also outlines some of the key issues that a successful IPO raises for SKS and the microfinance industry overall.

What poor people really want

October 23rd, 2009

Vanuatu-BoyBjorn Lomborg of the Copenhagen Consensus (see my previous post on Priorities for helping the world’s poor), posted an OpEd in today’s WSJ entitled “The View from Vanuatu on Climate Change“.  Vanuatu politicians have been some of the most vocal proponents of carbon cuts to prevent global warming destructive impacts on his country.

Rather than theorizing a lot about what the poor really want (which is essentially the approach of the Copenhagen Consensus), he decided to visit the tiny island nation of Vanuatu and ask some locals about how they would prioritize things.

Here’s what one woman said: “Having a boat in the village to use for fishing, transporting goods to sell, and to get to hospital in emergencies.  She doesn’t want more aid money because ‘there is too much corruption in the government and it goes in people’s pockets,’ but she would like microfinance schemes instead. ‘Give money directly to the people for businesses so we can support ourselves without having to rely on government.’”

I won’t comment here on the extreme disconnect between her country’s president and her situation.

Microfinance is very effective in getting cash to the poor

One of the lesser told benefits of microfinance is that money actually does get into the hands of the poor.  Every penny of every $50 loan is accounted for in financial records which are then audited regularly.  Every borrower has a pass book which details what they’ve received and paid.  And I know from first hand experience that even illiterate borrowers understand very clearly exactly what they’ve received, paid back and their outstanding balances.  It is much more difficult for governments and other middlemen to get in between the transactions and fraudulently steal money designated for the poor like what happens in most other charitable schemes.

As Mother Teresa would say (in paraphrase), “We talk a lot about the poor when we need to be talking to the poor.”

Creating a World Without Poverty book review

January 29th, 2008

Creating a World Without Poverty: How Social Businesses Can Transform Our Lives
by Muhammad Yunus

Muhammad Yunus, 2006 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, has recently released his second book, Creating a World Without Poverty. The centerpiece of this book is Yunus proposal for a new kind of institution called a “social business” which is a for-profit business which has as its top objective a social objective/mission. Yunus makes a passionate argument for the benefit and role of social businesses in helping us move extreme poverty to museums.

I have written a fair amount on Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize winner and his first book, Banker to the Poor on my blog. Yunus is an incredible innovator and one of my current day heroes who has made a huge impact on addressing global poverty. So, I was eager to read his new (and second) book.

While I do recommend reading this book, I would call this less of a book and more of a collection of stories and speeches on topics with a little more detail thrown in than a speech generally allows. So, don’t be expecting something “integrated”, but a bunch of Yunus’ current thinking and favorite topics.

Social Business. The centerpiece of this book is Yunus’ concept of a social business. His argument is that humans are actually interested in more than self-interest … they are also interested in helping others. Traditionally, there are 3 primary organization types: (i) for-profit businesses; (ii) non-profits/NGOs and (iii) government. He is proposing the need (and opportunity) to launch a new entity, a social business, to serve the needs of the world’s poorest citizens.

Yunus has a rather specific and narrow definition of the term/concept of a “social business.” Yunus defines two kinds of social businesses: (a) a business which is owned by the poor; and (b) a business where investors are only allowed to receive back their capital invested (that is, no additional return whatsoever.) He primarily focuses on (b) where the primary objective of a social business is a specific social objective plus it must be self-sustaining (i.e. generate financial surplus) in order to provide on-going and growing fulfillment of its social mission. Type (a) social businesses can be pure profit-making machines with the benefit to the poor provided through the profit surplus. Or social businesses could be both type (a) and (b) like Grameen Bank.

Yunus sees no room for businesses with owners/investors (other than poor people) which earn a profit (he calls them profit-maximizing) calling themselves social businesses or having any long-term potential for delivering much social benefit to the poor. He believes that the profit motive will always win-out and these hybrids will ultimately not serve the poor. He also assesses other examples of organization formats to help the poor including coops and NGOs. [See separate response to Yunus' social business concept.]

Social Entrepreneurs. Yunus defines social businesses as a subset of the larger social entrepreneur segment. That is, all social business operators are social entrepreneurs, but not all social entrepreneurs run social businesses. That is, what they do is either not run as a for-profit/sustaining business and/or it doesn’t meet his criteria for a social business per above.

The Grameen Bank Story. There is a whole section/long chapter dedicated to succinctly telling the story of the Grameen Bank. For those of you who who haven’t read Banker to Poor, this hits many of the story high points (and some later additional points) in much fewer words.

Grameen Companies. Yunus provides one of the first overviews (that I’ve seen) of the 24 (!) companies/entities that Grameen Bank has launched in the last 25 years. He describes what they are doing and identifies some as successful and others as work-in-progress. All of them are intended to help the poor in Bangladesh with just one, Grameen Trust, which is seeking to help the poor outside Bangladesh today.

The Grameen Danone Story. Yunus tells in detail the story of how the new Grameen Danone venture in Bangladesh transpired. [I wrote about it here a while ago and got it mostly right ;-)] This is Yunus’ posterchild example of a social business (except it does pay 1% dividends). It is a very compelling and interesting story of how Danone, the world’s largest yogurt company created a new JV with Grameen in Bangladesh to deliver nutritious food products to the poor of Bangladesh. Their first product is a tasty, healthy yogurt product aimed at children which is priced right and is run as a business. Grameen Bank borrowers provide the milk through the cows they have financed. Danone designed a new micro-yogurt factory that supplies a local area and is sold door-to-door by women entrepreneurs from Grameen Bank in their villages. This is a great example of a social business.

The Poor Lack Capital. Yunus has a strong belief that the first place to start with helping the poor is to provide capital. He argues that at the core of poverty is that the poor lack capital so “the poor work for the benefit of someone else who controls the capital.” He says that “poverty arises from the fact that they cannot retain the genuine results of their labor”, so “the poor work for the benefit of someone else who controls the capital.” Sounds like Marx, huh? Yunus is very much a democracy advocate and capitalist though and encourages a business (not socialist) approach to addressing poverty. In fact, he is quite negative about the ability of non-profits/NGOs and government to provide much help to the poor without the contribution of business.

Microcredit Interest Rates. Yunus has a very simple test for whether interest rates charged for microcredit are fair. He grades interest rates that are up to 10% above cost of funds as “green” (best), 10-15% above as “yellow” (warning) and >15% as “red” (he calls them “moneylenders”). He then has a few footnotes which admit that there should be some exceptions. While I agree that philosophically that there should be more transparency and accompanying scrutiny on interest rates charged by MFIs, his formula is very centric on Bangladesh and other like countries like India and are not reflective of the realities of the cost of doing business in most other emerging market countries. So, unfortunately, I think his test is more the exception than the rule.

International Capital for Microfinance. Curious to me, Yunus picks a fight and argues that international/foreign equity and debt capital for bad for MFIs. Some of this comes from his perspective that these investors have for-profit objectives (counter to his social business criteria) and some from the additional cost due to currency risk issues. He argues for national, subsidized megafunds to provide the capital to MFIs along with urging governments to authorize MFIs to collect and then re-lend savings (currently prohibited in most countries with Bangladesh being a notable exception.) I think his first point is too restrictive as there just isn’t enough subsidized capital to go around. I am fully in support of his second point on savings and think that this would be a huge benefit to the poor.

Technology for the Poor. Yunus is a big proponent of the power of technology to transform and uplift the poor. Grameen Bank has launched companies which have brought cell phones and internet services to villages across Bangladesh. And yes, the poor have very productive means of taking advantage of these services. He encourages the development of new technologies which are targeted at the poor. Probably his most interesting idea is a handheld device which provides simultaneous translation so the poor can more easily communicate with the globally important economic languages.

So, quite a bit to chew on from an economist from Bangladesh!
UPDATE: Here is Grameen Foundation’s blog on this book

Banker to the Poor book review

August 21st, 2005

bankerBanker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty

by Muhammad Yunus

Yunus is probably the most well-known microfinance practitioner having started The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in the 1970’s and led it ever since to its current state where it serves millions of micro-entrepreneurial women across Bangladesh and, through replication, in many other countries. Yunus is very much a practitioner, a continuing innovator and activist for practical solutions to putting poverty to where it belongs … a museum.

This is his first book which tells the story of birth of the Grameen Bank up until mid 2000′s.  If you want more up-to-date writings on Grameen Bank, I recommend:

Related Posts:

Grameen update
Grameen and Yunus win Nobel Peace Prize
Grameen now lends to beggars
Yunus: Statesman for the poor
Yunus bio

Give Us Credit book review

August 19th, 2005

giveuscreditGive Us Credit: How Muhammad Yunus’s Micro-Lending Revolution is Empowering Women from Bangladesh to Chicago

by Alex Counts

Counts heads up Grameen Foundation USA, the non-profit extension of The Grameen Bank – one of the first, large-scale successful microfinance banks based in Bangladesh. Counts shares the story of The Grameen Bank from its early inception in Bangladesh to where it is today. In parallel, he tells the story of an attempt of another NGO helping micro-entrepreneurial women in South Chicago with micro-loans.

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